

THE APHORISM OF THE VEDA'NTA PHILOSOPHY BY BA'DARA'YANA

Bādarāyaṇa





THE APHORISMS
OF THE
VEDA'NTA PHILOSOPHY;

BY
BA'DARA'YANA.

WITH
ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARY.

IN SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH.

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P R E F A C E .

The great body of Hindú Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible, they being designed not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school, as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted ; and, this being their end, the obscurity, which must needs attach to them in the eyes of the uninstructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault.

For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an accurate translation of the Aphorisms, with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits, in the Benares Sanskrit College, having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learned Bráhmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve further the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East as regards that of the West.

J. R. B.

Benares College, }
5th January, 1851. }

THE APHORISMS KNOWN AS THE BRAHMA-SU-
TRAS, THE S'ÁRÍRAKA SU'TRAS, OR THE
VEDÁNTA-SU'TRAS.

BOOK I. CHAPTER I.

Salutation to the venerable Gaṇeśa !

I reverence the pair of feet of the venerable Rāma, the instrument [in the attainment] of undivided joy,—from the touch of the dust whereof even a *stone* [—in the shape of the petrified Ahalyá, the wife of Gautama, whose story may be found in the *Rámáyana*—Book I. sect. 38—] attained felicity.*

SECTION I.

OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE.

*The reader to whom
the work is addressed.*

a. Finding one, in this world, who had perused the Vedas in conformity with the injunction of their constant perusal, and

* श्री गणेशाय नमः ॥ श्रीरामचरणद्वन्द्वानन्दसाधनं ।
नमामि यद्भजोयोगात्पाषाणो ऽपि सुखं भवति ॥

[hence] possessing a rough knowledge [of the sense of what he had thus perseveringly perused], desiring to attain the chief end of [the soul of] man [—the “sumum bonum”—], not hankering after the fruits of this world or of any one beyond it[—finding such a one—], the pre-eminently benevolent BĀDARĀYAṆA aphorised*—as follows.

अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ॥ १ ॥

APH. 1. Next, therefore, [O student that
The subject proposed. hast attained thus far] a desire to know God
 [is to be entertained by thee].

a. Here the word ‘next’ means immediately on the [enquirer’s] attainment of the quaternion of requisites†—[which, as explained in the *Vedānta-sāra*, § 9, are] a perception of the distinction of the eternal reality from the transient, a disregard of the enjoyment of the fruits of both here and hereafter, the possession of tranquillity and self-restraint, and the desire of liberation.‡]

b. The word ‘therefore’ refers to the reason [why a desire to know the nature of God ought to be experienced by the student

* इह खलु नित्याध्ययनविधिना ऽधीतस्वाध्यायमापातज्ञानवन्तं
 परमपुरुषार्थकाममैहिकामुष्मिकफलेषु विरक्तमुपलभमानः परम-
 कारुणिको बादरायणस्मृत्यामास ॥भा०॥

† अत्रायंशब्दसाधनचतुष्टयसम्पत्त्यनन्तर्यार्थः ॥

‡ साधनानि नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकेहामुच्यन्ते भोगविरागशमद-
 मादिसम्पत्तिमुमुक्षुत्वानि ॥ वे० सार० ॥

properly qualified to enter upon the enquiry ;—and this reason is] because the Veda itself shows us that the fruits of keeping up the sacred fire and of the like expedients [for the attainment] of blessedness, are not *eternal*.* For example [the Veda declares]—“ As, here, the world obtained by works perishes, just so, yonder, the world obtained by virtue perishes.”† So too it shows us that the chief end of [the soul of] man is [to be attained] through the knowledge of God—[for the Veda tells us] “ He who knows God obtains the highest” &c.‡ Therefore what is wanting [to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism] is this, that “after the attainment of the requisites, as declared, a desire to know God is to be formed.”§

c. The expression *brahma-jijnāśā* means ‘ desire to know God’ —[being made up of the two words *brahma* and *jijnāśā*.] The word *jijnāśā* [according to its etymology as a desiderative derivative from the root *jñā* ‘ to know’] means ‘ the desire to know ;’—and the word *brahma* ‘ God’ means what is next to be told.||

* अतश्शब्दो हेत्वर्थः । यस्माद्देह एवाग्निहोत्रादीनां श्रेयस्साधनानामनित्यफलतां दर्शयति ॥

† तद्यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयत् एवमेवामुच पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयत् इत्यादि ॥

‡ तथा ब्रह्मज्ञानादपि परमपुरुषार्थं दर्शयति । ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परमित्यादि ॥

§ तस्माद्यथोक्तसाधनसम्पत्पनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्येति शेषः ।

॥ ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा । ज्ञातुमिच्छा जिज्ञासा ।

ब्रह्मच वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणम् ॥

d. In the preceding aphorism it was stated that *God* ought to be desired to be known. How then, [it will of course be asked,] is this 'God' defined [—or, in other words, what is the characteristic mark—*lakṣhaṇa*—by which we may be able to recognise the object of our search—]? Therefore the venerable maker of the aphorisms declares as follows.*

जन्माद्यस्य यतः ॥ २ ॥

What is meant by the name 'God.'

APH. 2. [God is that one] Whence the birth &c. of this [universe results.]

a. The compound [*janmādi*—rendered 'birth &c.' and meaning literally] 'that of which the first is birth or production,' is a Bahuvrīhi compound of the kind [mentioned in the *Laghu Kaumudī*, under No. 541, as] "denoting that of which the matters implied in the name are perceived along with the thing itself." [For] the meaning of the compound is 'birth, continuance, and dissolution:†' [—so that 'birth,' which is a part of the compound word, is also a part of the thing meant by the compound].

b. And [as some one may ask why, in the compound word denoting 'birth continuance and dissolution,' we speak of 'birth,' rather than of either of the others, as the *first*,—we may mention that] the treatment of 'birth' as the *first* has a regard both to the teachings of the Veda and to the nature of things. The teaching

* पूर्वसूचे ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यमित्युक्तं । किंलक्षणं पुनस्तदब्रह्मे-
त्यत आह भगवान् सूचकारः ॥

† जन्मोत्पत्तिरादिर्यस्येति तद्गुणरुचिज्ञानो बह्वब्रवीद्विः । जन्म-
स्थितिभङ्गं समासार्थः ॥

of the Veda, on the one hand, [authorises the form of expression in question] by exhibiting the consecutive order, of birth continuance and dissolution, in the sentence beginning with “or whence these elements are *produced*” &c. The nature of things also [authorises the form of expression in question] because the continuance or the dissolution is possible of that concrete thing alone which, through production, has obtained an existence.*

The created universe as far as we are concerned.

c. ‘Of this’—i. e. of whatever concrete thing is presented to those [our instruments of cognition] among which the senses stand first.† By the ‘this,’ then, is denoted the

things concreted with those properties whereof the being produced is the first in order. By the ‘whence’ is denoted the [Grand First] Cause.‡

The conception of God according to the Aphorism when explicated.

d. The meaning, then, of the aphorism is this, that, *That One* is God, from Whom, Omniscient, Almighty, First Cause, there is the production the continuance and the dissolution of this world, adjusted as it is

* जन्मनश्चादित्वं अतिनिर्देशापेक्षं वस्तुवृत्तापेक्षश्च । अतिनिर्दिष्टत्वावत् । यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्त इत्यस्मिन् वाक्ये जन्मस्थितिप्रलयानां क्रमप्रदर्शनात् । वस्तुवृत्तमपि जन्मना लब्धात्मकस्य धर्मिणः स्थितिप्रलयसम्भवात् ॥

† अस्येति । प्रत्यक्षादिसन्निधापितस्य धर्मिणः ॥

‡ इदमा निर्देशः । जन्मादिधर्मसम्बन्धा अर्थाः । यत इति कारणनिर्देशः ॥

with its names and natures—[for language, as well as the things about which language is conversant, is regarded as the work of God—], furnished with its various agents & experiencers, the locality where are [experienced] those [fruits] of action which [fruits] are determined by established places and times—[for the character of a bare act, such as the extending of one's arm, is determined by the fact whether *there* and *then* that action was appropriate]—, and the nature of the construction of which [world] even the mind cannot conceive.* And thus, then, the *characteristic* of God—or that by which we are to recognise what is meant when the word 'God' is employed—is this, that He is the *cause of the production &c. of the world.*†

e. Here [—i. e. in speaking of the *modes* of mundane things—] we take in [or specify] production continuance and dissolution [and no others], because the other modifications of state are included under those three.‡

f. By saying that God is the *Cause* of the world, the maker of the aphorisms has, by the sense of the sentence, laid down the proposition that He is *Omniscient*; because creation, by one intelligent, presupposes *knowledge*. And thus God *knows* all because He *made* all. It is an admitted principle that he who

* अस्य जगतो नामरूपाभ्यां व्याहृतस्य । अनेककर्तृभोक्तृसंयुक्तस्य । प्रतिनियतदेशकालनिमित्तक्रियाफलाश्रयस्य । मनसाद्यचिन्द्यरचनारूपस्य । जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं यतस्सर्वज्ञात्सर्वशक्तेः कारणाद्भवति तदेव ब्रह्मेति सूचार्थः ॥

† तथाच जगज्जन्मादिकारणत्वं ब्रह्मणो लक्षणम् ॥

‡ अन्येषां भावविकाराणां त्रिष्वेवान्तर्भाव इति जन्मस्थितिलयानामिह ग्रहणम् ॥

makes anything knows it,—as a potter [knows a water-jar—so far forth as it is a water-jar—else how could he make one ? and God made everything so far forth as it is anything].*

g. By being represented as the *Cause* of the world, God was *implied* to be omniscient and almighty. It is merely to *impress* this that he says† [as follows].

शास्त्रयोनित्वात् ॥३॥

APH. 3. [That God is omniscient follows] from the fact of [His] being the source of the Scriptures, [—or—on an alternative rendering—from the fact that the Scriptures, which declare this omniscience, are the source—scilicet of our knowledge—of Him.]

a. God is the source, i. e. the [only possible] cause, of a great Scripture such as the Rig-veda, augmented by its various repertories of learning [—meaning those appendages of the Veda, grammar &c.]—illuminating, as a lamp, everything, and [itself] the next thing to something omniscient. For—of such a Scripture as the Rig-veda and the like, which [by containing

* ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वात् सर्वज्ञत्वमर्थात्सूचकता प्रतिज्ञातं चेतनसृष्टेर्ज्ञानपूर्वकत्वात् । तथाच ब्रह्म सर्वज्ञं सर्वकारणत्वात् ।
यो यत्कर्त्ता स तज्ज्ञो यथा कुलाल इति सिद्धम् ॥

† जगत्कारणत्वप्रदर्शनेन सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिब्रह्मत्यपदिष्टं । तदेव हृदयस्माह ॥

information in regard to *everything*] is associated with the qualities of one omniscient, the origin could not have been from one otherwise than omniscient.*

Illustration of the induction by means of which this certainty is arrived at.

b. [In illustration of this, it may be observed that] it is an admitted fact that whatever treatise, embracing a wide range of topics, emanates from any particular man—as the *grammar*, for example, from Pánini—, although its topics be but a *part* of what is capable of being known [—or of the omne scibile—],—that man, even in consideration of *that* is inferred to be exceedingly knowing† [—and the author of a work that explains *everything* must, by parity of reasoning, be inferred to be omniscient.]

c. [And the omniscience of God may be learned] from such texts of the Veda as this, viz., “The Rig-veda, and the Yajur-veda is [—notwithstanding its excellence—not the product of laborious effort, but] the mere out-breathing of this Great Being.” The drift of this text is this, viz.,—what need is there to declare

* महत् ऋग्वेदादेश्चास्त्रस्यानेकविद्यास्थानोपदृक्षितस्य प्रदी-
पवत्सर्वार्थद्योतिनस्सर्वज्ञकल्पस्य योनिः कारणं ब्रह्म । नहीदृशस्य
शास्त्रस्य ऋग्वेदादिलक्षणस्य सर्वज्ञगुणान्वितस्य सर्वज्ञान्यतस्स-
म्भवो ऽस्ति ॥

† यद्यद्विस्तारार्थं शास्त्रं यस्मात्पुरुषविशेषात्सम्भवति यथा व्या-
करणादि पाणिन्यादेर्ज्ञैकदेशार्थमपि स ततो ऽप्यधिकतर विज्ञान
इति प्रसिद्धम् ॥

the omniscience and the omnipotence of that Great Being, the Absolute, when he is [proved to be omniscient &c. by his being recognised as] the source of such works as the Rig-veda &c.* ?

The alternative rendering of the third Aphorism. d. [But there is another interpretation of the aphorism, for, according to the commentator,] otherwise—the Scripture, i. e. the Rig-veda and the rest, as above described,—is the source or cause or proof of *Him*,—of God—as far as regards our comprehension of His nature :—that is to say—it is from the Scriptures, as our evidence for the fact, that we come to comprehend that He is the cause of the production &c. of the world.† Such a text [—from which the fact may be learned that God is the cause of the production &c. of the world—] is that one already cited under the preceding aphorism—viz., “ Or

* अस्य महतो भूतस्य निश्चसितमेवैतद्यद्वेदे यजुर्वेदे इत्यादिश्रुतेः ॥ यस्य महतो भूतस्यापरिच्छिन्नस्य तादृशत्वाददिवोनित्वं तस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तित्वञ्च किं वक्तव्यमित्याशयः ॥

† वर्षकान्तरं । अथवा । यथोक्तव्येदादिशास्त्रं योनिः कारणं प्रमाणमस्य ब्रह्मणो यथावत्स्वरूपाधिगमे शास्त्रादेव प्रमाणाज्जगते जन्मादिकारणमधिगम्यत इत्यभिप्रायः ॥

whence these elements are produced" &c.* [see § 2. c.]

Objections, of the Mīmāṃsā, to the allegation that the Veda aims directly at revealing God.

e. [In the foregoing Aphorism, according to its second interpretation, it is asserted that the Institutes are what make us to know God ;—but the followers of the *Mīmāṃsā* object to this, declaring that the direct design of the Scriptures is to reveal *what we ought to do*—and not to reveal God apart from any consideration of a line of conduct to be followed in respect of Him. In order to obviate these objections, the orthodox tenet is laid down in the aphorism here following.]

तत्तु समन्वयात् ॥ ४ ॥

That it aims directly at revealing God—the only consistent theory of the Veda.

APH. 4. But That One [—viz. God—is what the Scriptures declare, not with a view to anything ulterior, but simply in order that what is so declared may be known ; and we make this assertion] because there is consistency [in this view, whilst the opposite view would land us in inconsistencies.]

a. The word “but” is intended to rebut the first view of the case† [stated in §. 3. e.]

* शास्त्रमुदाहृतं पूर्वसूत्रे यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्त इत्यादि ॥

† तु शब्दः पूर्वपक्षव्याप्यार्थः ॥

b. "That One," i. e. God, is declared in the *Vedāntas* [—i. e. in those theological sections of the Vedas usually termed *upani-shads*—] as the direct object of declaration [—and not merely, see §. 3. c.,—as a mediate step to the injunction of *works* :]—why?—"because there is consistency." Consistency means the suiting of expressions well together among themselves—and *that* is our reason* [—in as much as we find this consistency among the expressions of Scripture when we hold the pronoun "That" to refer to God, but not otherwise].

c. [We make the assertions made in § 4 b. because it is a maxim that] *consistency* is that in virtue of which any one [out of several offered interpretations] is [to be recognised as] that which conveys the real import.†

d. Now, in order to demolish the opinion of those who wish [it to be believed] that God is set forth, in the theological part of the Vedas, [incidentally] through the injunction of devotions, and who do not wish [it to be believed] that the direct design [of the scriptures] is to declare God as He is,—another comment [on § 4] is undertaken.‡

* तद्ब्रह्म वेदान्तेषु तात्पर्येण प्रतिपाद्यते । कुतः । समन्वयात् । सम्यगन्वयस्समन्वयः । तस्मात् ॥

† अन्वयस्य सम्यक्तां तात्पर्यवन्त्वम् ॥

‡ सम्प्रति सिद्धे व्युत्पत्तिमनिच्छतां उपासतिविधिद्वारा वेदान्तेभ्यो ब्रह्मसिद्धिमिच्छतां मतनिरासाय वर्णकान्तरमारभ्यते ॥

e. In the opinion of these [followers of the Mīmāṃsā § 4 d., the theological parts of the Vedas announce God] not as what is to be declared for itself, but with a view to something ulterior [—viz., as the object of the devotions which are enjoined]. They are not concerned [say these objectors] about God simply as he is—because [if you assert that they are so, then] there is an absence of the characteristic [by which an *Institute* or *S'āstra* is recognized—viz. *injunctions* respecting] conduct. Since an Institute has in view [as its direct object] the doing and forbearing [which it enjoins in respect of acts to be done or forborne], it is not possible that the name of Institute [*S'āstra*—derived as it is from the root *s'ās* 'to enact'] should belong [—as both parties agree it *does* belong—] to it [i. e. to the *Upanishad* if the object in view were merely God as he *is** [and not as He is to be acted towards].

f. Further [the objector goes on to say], it would present no end to be gained [if the *Upanishad* were intended merely to declare God as he is—which declaration according to the Vedānta, be it remembered, involves, the declaration, addressed to every one that,

Remark, of the Mīmāṃsā, that if man, on knowing God, is God, he does not seem to be much the better for it.

"Thou art That One"—], for we do not see that any end is gained even on the knowledge taking place that "I am Brahma." If the end *were* gained through such

* तच्च । वेदान्ता विधेयोपासनाविषयत्वेन ब्रह्म समर्पयन्ति ।
 प्रवृत्त्यादिविज्ञाभावात्सिद्धब्रह्मपराः । किञ्च प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिपर-
 स्त्वेव शास्त्रत्वेन सिद्धब्रह्मपरत्वे शास्त्रत्वञ्च न सम्भवति ॥

knowledge [which knowledge, you assert, it is the direct purpose of the Scriptures to communicate], then there would not be [as, however, there is,] the enjoining of such things as *Meditation** [on the great fact—which to know at all is to know as completely as it can be known after any amount of meditation—for you either know it or you do not, the case not being one that admits of degrees.]

g. Therefore [the objector concludes], since, on meeting with such injunctions as “Only towards Soul should he direct his devotions”—“He who knows Brahma, becomes Brahma”—“He who is desirous of becoming Brahma should effect an understanding of Brahma—or of *Soul*,”—[since, on meeting with these] the question arises *who* is this ‘Soul’?—all the *Upanishads* are serviceable [—for we do not dispute their utility—] in as much as they declare Him [—and, by answering the question, and so rendering the injunctions intelligible, subserve the direct aim of the Veda—viz. the conveying of injunctions;]—and Emancipation is to be accomplished [not by a mere *knowledge* of God, but] by devotions. Well—this objection having presented itself, it is stated [by the author of the Aphorisms in reply] “But That One, because there is consistency”†[—§ 4.] The meaning is this, that, “That One,” i. e.

* नापि प्रयोजनवत्त्वं । अहं ब्रह्मास्मितीति ज्ञाने सत्यपि प्रयोजनस्यादर्शनाद्यद्येवम्भूतज्ञानात्प्रयोजनसिद्धिस्तर्हि मननादिविधानं न स्यात् ॥

† तस्मादात्मैत्येवोपासीत । ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति । ब्रह्मभवन-
कामो ब्रह्मवेदनं कुर्यादित्येवमादिषु विधिषु कोऽसावात्मैत्याकांक्षा-

God, is declared, in the theological parts of the Vedas, *simpliciter*; —why?—because this leads to no inconsistency* — and the Mīmāṃsā supposition does].

Emancipation cannot be the fruit of works.

h. And it is not true, for the matter of that, that Emancipation is to be accomplished by [such works as] devotional exercises [§ 4. *b.*], for, since devotional exercise admits of degrees, there would be in the Emancipation thereby accomplished also differences of degree, and thus it would not be *absolute*† [—which is what we do not allow to be Emancipation at all].

The emancipated necessarily disembodied.

i. [And devotional exercises, subserved by a knowledge of God—see § 4. *g.*—cannot lead directly to absolute emancipation—see § 4. *h.*—] because, since a *body* is indispensable during the condition of enjoying the fruit of enjoined acts, there would be a body even in *Emancipation* [from the body and all that belongs to it—which is absurd].

Absolute emancipation implies the absence of things pleasing as well as of things displeasing.

Moreover [if the emancipated had a body] there would not be [—as, however, there is—] the denial that the emancipated is touched by what is pleasing or displeasing —[which denial we find in the following text] viz., “Him that abideth bodiless nei-

यां तत्समपकत्वेन सर्वे वेदान्ता उपयुज्यन्ते । उपासनासाध्यश्च मोक्ष इति प्राप्ते । उच्यते । तत्तु समन्वयात् ।

* तद्ब्रह्म साक्षाद्देवान्तप्रतिपाद्यं । कुतः । समन्वयादित्यर्थः ॥

† न तावदुपासनासाध्यो मोक्षः । उपासनायास्तारतम्येन तत्साध्यमोक्षस्यापि तारतम्यमनित्यत्वञ्च स्यात् ।

“ther what is pleasing nor what is displeasing doth touch;”—for, if Emancipation were the fruit of meritorious acts then it would be something pleasing* [—*all* the fruits of meritorious acts, according to Scripture, being something pleasant.]

j. Therefore the theological parts of the Vedas are conversant about God directly, and not [indirectly] through injunctions [which give occasion for the mention of him—see § 4. g.—] and thus it is established that God is revealed by the Institutes independently† [—i.e. simply to the end that He may be known].

Summary, recapitulative, of the first four Aphorisms.

k. Thus has it been stated, in four Aphorisms, that God is the Omniscient, the omnipotent, the cause of the world, the object of revelation in the theological parts

of the Vedas.‡

SECTION II.

CONFUTATION OF THE ATHEISTICAL DOCTRINE OF THE SĀNKHYAS.

1. [The following question has been mooted]—Is “That

* विधेयकर्मफलभोगदशायां शरीरस्यावश्यकत्वेन मोक्षे ऽपि शरीरं स्यात् । किञ्चाशरीरं वावसन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशत इति मुक्तस्य प्रियाप्रियस्पर्शनिषेधो न स्यात् । मोक्षस्य धर्मफलत्वेन तस्यैव प्रियस्य विद्यमानत्वात् ॥

† तस्माद्देदान्तास्माच्चादेव ब्रह्मणि समनुगता न विधिद्वारेति सिद्धं ब्रह्म स्वतन्त्रमेव शास्त्रप्रमाणकमिति ॥

‡ एवं चतुर्भिस्सूत्रैस्सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिं जगत्कारणं वेदान्तप्रतिपाद्यं ब्रह्मेत्युक्तम् ॥

The question whether the Cause of the world is intelligent or unintelligent.

One" [spoken of in § 4] something thinking or something unthinking? The Sāṅkhyas, in regard to this, [—admitting the authority, but taking liberties in regard to the interpretation, "of the Vedas,] say— "The cause of the world cannot be a God "who is fixed [in one perpetual and universal monotony of state], "because there is neither the possibility of knowledge nor of "action [in such a being]; but *Nature* [—see the *Tattwa Samāsa* "§ 7.—] is the cause of the world, because there *is* [in nature] "that [viz. the possibility of knowledge and of action]. Taking "into account its [constituent] quality of purity [*Tattwa Samāsa* "§ 96—] its capability of knowing follows of course, and, by "means of all its three qualities, it is capable of acting. [On the "other hand] Brahma, from being but one thing [along with "nothing else] cannot act:—therefore the Upanishads, by the "expression 'That One,' speak of omniscient and omnipotent "*Nature*."* In the design to demolish the opinion of those "who hold this opinion], the following Aphorism originates."

ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम् ॥ ५ ॥

APH. 5. ["Nature"—as declared by the Sāṅkhyas to be the

* वस्तुतस्तच्चेतनमचेतनं वा । तच्च सांख्याः कूटस्थब्रह्मणी ज्ञान-
क्रियाशक्त्याभावान्न जगत्कारणत्वं । प्रधानस्य तु तत्सत्त्वाज्जगत्कारण-
त्वं । सत्त्वगुणमादाय ज्ञानशक्तिमत्त्वं । त्रिगुणत्वाक्रियाशक्तिमत्त्वं ।
ब्रह्मण एकत्वान्न क्रियाशक्तिः । तस्मात्सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्ति प्रधानमेव तद-
नुवादका वेदान्ता इति वदन्ति ॥

Brute Nature not the Cause of the world, for the Cause is an intelligent one.

cause of the world—is] not so:—it is un-scriptural, because of the “reflecting” [or “seeing”, which Scripture speaks of as belonging to That which is the cause of the world.]

a. The “Nature” imagined [or postulated] by the Sāṅkhyas, is *not* the cause of the world. The reason [assigned in the Aphorism, for saying so,] is this, that “it is un-scriptural.” This [expression—viz. “un-scriptural”—] is an epithet pregnant with a reason. He means to say, [*Nature* is not the cause of the world], because it is not *this* [viz. *Nature*] that the Scripture—that is to say the *Veda*—furnishes the evidence of. The reason [for asserting] that Scripture does not furnish the evidence of what the Sāṅkhyas call “Nature,” is [the word cited in the Aphorism—viz.] “reflecting” [—or, literally, “seeing”—] which term [as it stands in the Aphorism] denoting the verbal root itself [—the employment of the word being that which the schoolmen term the *suppositio materialis*, and which the Sanskrit grammarians term *anukaraṇa*—] is intended to *indicate* [though it does not here *denote*] the *sense* of the verb “to see:” † [—conf. the *Sāhitya Darpaṇa* § 13. a.].

* तन्मतनिरासार्थमिदं सूत्रमारभ्यते ॥

† सांख्यपरिकल्पितं प्रधानं जगत्कारणं न भवति । तच्च हेतुर-
शब्दमिति । हेतुगर्भविशेषणमेतत् । अशब्दत्वादवेदप्रमाणक-
त्वादित्यर्थः । वेदाप्रमाणकत्वे हेतुः । ईक्षतेरिति धातुवाचकेक्ष-
तिशब्दो लक्षणया धात्वर्थेक्षणपरः ॥

†. Mr. Colebrooke [—Essays Vol. 1. p. 338.—], when rendering the 5th Aphorism, makes BĀDARĀYANA say “It is not so;—for ‘wish’ (consequently volition) is attributed to that cause.” The verb, however, is not *ish* ‘to wish,’ but *ikṣh* ‘to see.’

b. But then [the Sāṅkhyas rejoin]—it is certain that the cause of the world is not [proved to be] God by the mere [mention of] “reflecting” [or “seeing”]—for we hear of *senseless* things seeing—e. g. Water and Light—in such texts as “The Light saw,” “The Waters saw;”—and so likewise in regard to *Nature* the “seeing” is used in a secondary or transferred meaning* [—i. e. tropically]. This [argument of the Sāṅkhyas] having presented itself, it is declared† [by the author of the Aphorisms as follows.]

॥ गौणश्चेन्नात्मशब्दात् ॥ ६ ॥

The scriptural expressions, implying that the cause of the world is intelligent, not to be explained away figuratively.

APH. 6. If [you say that the expression “seeing” is] employed tropically [the reference being to Nature, which does not “see”—then I say] No,—because of the word ‘Soul’ [which is *not* applicable to Nature, and which *is* applied to That which is in question].

* Mr. Colebrooke (—Essays Vol. 1. p. 338—) views differently the scholastic term *gauna* which we have rendered by the expression “used in a secondary or transferred meaning.” Whately (—in his *Logic*, B. III. § 10.)—says with reference to this employment of words, “Thus we speak of Homer, for ‘the works of Homer’; and this is a secondary or transferred meaning.” So, in the *Sāhitya Darpaṇa*—(see the translation thereof, § 13 a)—the expression ‘a herd-station on the Ganges’ is cited as an instance where a word, the primary (*mukhya*) sense of which is ‘the stream of water named the Ganges’, is employed in the secondary (*gauna* or *lakṣaṇika*) sense of ‘the bank’ thereof. Mr. Colebrooke, applying these technical terms *mukhya* and *gauna* not to the employment of language, in a sense original or transferred, but to the dignity of character of the world’s cause, writes as follows. “In the sequel of the first chapter questions are raised upon divers passages of the *Vedas*, alluded to in the text, and quoted in the scholia, where minor attributes [*gauna*?] are seemingly assigned to the world’s cause; or in which subordinate designations occur, such as might be supposed to indicate an inferior being, but are shown to intend the supreme one.”—See § 8. a.

* नन्दीक्षणमात्रेण न ब्रह्म जगत्कारणमिति निश्चयः । तच्चेज ऐवम् । ता आप ऐवन्तेत्यचेतनयोरप्यप्तेजसोरीक्षणश्रवणात्प्रधाने ऽपि ईक्षतिगौणेति प्राप्ते । उच्यते ॥

a. If you say that the word “seeing” is used in a secondary sense [i. e. tropically] with reference to Nature, just as it is with reference to Water and Light [§ 5. b.], it is *not* as you say. Why? —“because of the word Soul”:—that is to say because we hear the word Soul* [applied to the Cause of the world, while it is *not* in any kind of way applicable to Nature].

b. But then [the Sāṅkhyas may yet rejoin—don't say *that*,] but let the term ‘Soul’ also [as well as the term referred to in § 5,] be used tropically with reference to Nature;—or even say that it denotes it *literally*, for the term [as may be learned from the dictionary] has a variety of meanings. Because of this [suggestion of the Sāṅkhyas] he says† [as follows].

॥ तन्निष्ठस्य मोक्षोपदेशात् ॥ ७ ॥

APH. 7. [That “That One” is not “Nature,” may be inferred] from the declaration that the Emancipation takes place of him who is intent upon “That”—[which “That,” if unintelligent,—as Nature is—it is absurd that a thinking being should intently strive to identify himself with].

a. ‘Nature’ is *not* denoted by the word ‘Soul,’—because, in such texts as the one beginning “The man that has a preceptor

* अज्ञेजसेरिव प्रधाने ऽपि ईक्षतिर्गोणेति चेन्न । कुतः ।

आत्मशब्दादात्मशब्दश्रवणादित्यर्थः ॥

† नन्वात्मशब्दो ऽपि प्रधाने गौणो ऽस्तु । नानार्थकतया मुख्यो वेत्यत आह ॥

knows," and so on,—the Emancipation is declared [of *whom?*—] of S'WETAKETU mentioned in this text "That art thou, O S'weta-
ketu!"—[but of S'weta-
ketu how circumstanced?—why—of S'weta-
ketu] who is going to be emancipated after having been instructed to fix his mind intently upon 'That One.' Now if unthinking 'Nature' were here denoted by the word 'That,' then the precept "That art thou" would cause the intelligent S'weta-
ketu, desirous of Emancipation, to understand as follows—"O thinking S'weta-
ketu!—thou art something unthinking." Then he, on the authority of that precept, pondering [as we are directed to ponder the precept, but pondering it under the erroneous impression that it means him to understand] "I am something unthinking," would miss his Emancipation and go to ruin :—and thus the precept would be [no better than] the babble of an idiot :—and this is not what we should like :—and therefore it is a settled point that the word "That" [§ 4] refers to an *intelligent* Being.*

b. But then [the Sāṅkhyas may still contend]—let it be supposed [—for the sake of argument—] that "Soul" is declared,

* न प्रधानमात्मशब्दवाच्यं । तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो इति श्वेत-
केतोश्चेतनस्य माक्षयितव्यस्य तन्निष्ठतामुपदिश्य आचार्यवान्पुरुषो
वेदेत्यदिना मीक्षोपदेशात् । यदि ह्यचेतनं प्रधानं तच्छब्दवा-
च्यमुमुक्षुं श्वेतकेतुं चेतनं तत्त्वमसीति शास्त्रं ग्राहयेत् । हे
श्वेतकेतो चेतनाचेतनो ऽसीति । तदा शास्त्रप्रामाण्यादचेतनो
ऽस्मीति ध्यायमानो मोक्षाद्व्याह्रियेत् । अनर्हश्चेयात् । तथाच
शास्त्रमुन्नतप्रलापो भवेत् । तच्चानिष्टं । तस्माच्चात्मशब्दश्चेत-
नपर इति सिद्धम् ॥

[—but at all events admit that, in the first instance, it is declared not *directly* by the word “That,” in Aphorism § 4, but *indirectly*] through the declaration of “Nature” [which we still contend is denoted directly by the “That”], in the same way as in [the directions for finding the small star Arundhatī, beginning with] “The large Arundhatī” &c.—With reference to this [wilily offered compromise of the Sāṅkhyas] he says*—

॥ हेयत्वावचनाच्च ॥ ८ ॥

What the Veda means directly by the Cause of the world is no rude type of God but God Himself.

APH. 8.—And [you must not say that the “That”—§ 4—denotes “Nature,” and that the conception of “Nature” is afterwards to be quitted for that of “Soul,”] because there is no direction that it [—whatever the primary denotation of the “That” may be—] is to be quitted [for any other].

a. If Nature,—meaning thereby something that is *not* Soul,—were denoted [in § 4] by the word “That,” then, on that occasion [when the declaration was made which runs thus—“That art thou”—] the declaration [—for we cannot suppose the declaration *designed* to mislead—] would have been “That—meaning That Soul—art thou:”—or, [if the ellipsis in the passage itself were still left unsupplied,—then assuredly] some precept, designed to declare the Supreme Soul, would tell us that that [first rude conception of God under the form of Nature] is to be *quitted*,—so that [we should understand, from that warning precept, that] he

* ननु, स्थूलारण्डूतीति न्यायेन प्रधानोपदेशद्वारा आत्मोपदेशो ऽयमस्त्वत आह ॥

[meaning S'wetaketu—see § 7. a.—] is *not*, is consequence of the [elliptically expressed] declaration of "That" [—which, on the hypothesis under consideration, denotes "Nature" and nothing else—] to become—through ignorance of the fact that *Soul* is meant—intent [in his meditations] upon *that* [which is not really meant through mentioned—viz. Nature. And this direction, to abandon the first rude conception after it had served its purpose of suggesting a better one, would resemble a familiar method of pointing out an object not itself readily discernible;—for the process would be] like as when a person wishing to point out [the small star, in the constellation of the Pleiades, called] Arundhati, [first directs attention to the large star near it, and then] tells that the [large] star standing near it is [not the one wanted, but is] to be quitted, [and the small star, which that large one stands near, is the one to be observed]:—such is the meaning:* —[and this wily suggestion, of the Sāṅkhyas, we Vedāntins repel,—because if we were to admit that the *primary* (*mukhya*) sense of the word 'That,' in Aph. 4., is 'Nature,' and that it means 'God' (—if at all—) only in a *secondary* (*gauna*) sense; then you Sāṅkhyas would go on to argue that your 'Nature'—for which you had secured the right of preoccupancy—suffices to account for the phenomena, and that the additional postulate of a Deity is an unphilosophical superfluity].†

* यद्यनात्मैव प्रधानं सच्चिद्वाच्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसीति इ-
होपदिष्टं स्यात् । स तदुपदेशनादनात्मज्ञतया तन्निष्ठो मा
भूदिति मुख्यमात्मानमुपदिर्शयिषु शास्त्रं तस्य हेयत्वं ब्रूयात् ।
यथा अरुन्धतीं दिदर्शयिषुस्तत्त्वमीपस्यतारायाः हेयत्वं ब्रूते
तद्वदित्यर्थः ॥

† Here compare the note on § 5. b.

The knowledge of God involves all knowledge. b. The word "And" [—in the Aph. 8. —is intended not to connect the reason there assigned with any reason expressly assigned before, but] is intended to attach it in addition to [the unexpressed reason] that this [theory of the Sāṅkhyas] is opposed to the arriving at *all* knowledge by means of a single case of knowing *; [and what we here assert—viz—] that all knowledge is arrived at [not by the successive steps of the Sāṅkhyas, but,] by one single knowing, is declared in Scripture†.

c. That it is not Nature that is denoted by the term 'The Existent' in [the passage of Scripture beginning with] 'The Existent alone, O Saumya!'—is inferrible also from the reason which he states ‡ [in the following Aphorism].

॥ साध्ययात् ॥ ९ ॥

APH. 9. Because into Himself is the return [of all souls].

It cannot be admitted that the thinking Soul is to be resolved into unthinking Nature.

a. The meaning of the aphorism is this, [that it cannot be *Nature* that is spoken of —see §. 8. c.—as the 'Existent'—i. e., the 'Self-existent']—because of Absorption—i. e., because we hear [in Scripture] of the melting away [of previously embodied souls] into *Himself*, who is in question,—the *Soul* that is denoted by the term 'the Existent.' If *Nature* were what is there denoted by the term 'the Existent,' then there

* एकविज्ञानात्सर्वविज्ञानोपक्रमविरोधसमुच्चयार्थश्च शब्दः ॥

† एकविज्ञानात्सर्वविज्ञानोपक्रमश्चूयते ॥

‡ सदेव सौम्येति सच्छब्दवाच्यं प्रधानमिदं ऽपि न भवतीत्याह ॥

would be this [absurd] contradiction that the *intelligent* melts away into the *unintelligent*. Therefore the Cause of the World is that intelligent One, denoted by the term 'the Existent,' into whom is the return of all intelligences.*

b. Moreover†, [the assertion that not Nature but God is meant by 'the Existent,' or the Cause of the world, is proved by the reason stated in the Aphorism here following].

॥ गतिसामान्यात् ॥ १० ॥

APH. 10. From the sameness of the understanding [of the term 'the Existent' through out the scriptures].

a. The meaning is—[that God is meant by the term, and not Nature—to which it might be plausibly referred only in *some* passages—] because of the sameness of the understanding—i. e. of the recognising an *intelligent* Cause [as spoken of] throughout the whole of the theological parts of the *Vedas*; for we no-

That the Cause of the world is an intelligent God—the only consistent interpretation of Scripture.

where find the contradictory assertion in one sentence of an intelligent Cause and in another one of an unintelligent one—but everywhere an intelligent Cause alone is understood. The texts [for example] about the order of creation, in the *Taitirīya Upanishad*, exhibit Soul alone as the Cause. There-

* स्वस्मिन्प्रकृते सच्छब्दवाच्यात्मनि अथयान्नयश्रवणादिति सूचार्थः । तच्च यदि प्रधानमेव सच्छब्दवाच्यं तदा चेतने ऽचेतनमर्थेतीति विरुद्धं स्यात् । अतो यस्मिन्नथयस्सर्वेषां चेतनानां तच्चेतनं सच्छब्दवाच्यं जगत्कारणमिति ॥

† किञ्च ॥

fore the net result [of the Aphorisms 5—10] is this that, whichever way you view the matter, Nature is *not* what is meant by the term 'The Existent,' nor is it the Cause of the World*.

b. Moreover† [that the Cause of the World is not the unintelligent but the intelligent, may be proved by the reason next to be stated—viz.—]

। अतत्वाच्च । ११ ।

APH. 11. And because it is so revealed [in Scripture].

a. The meaning is as follows :—That, by the term "Himself" [—see § 9—], is meant an Omniscient Ruler, the Cause of the World, [is proved] by the fact of its being so declared [in the scripture,—to take an instance—] in the *S'wetās'watara* section of the *Mantra Upanishad*, where we are told "And of Him no one is the parent nor is any one the overruler" &c. Therefore it is a settled point that the Cause of the World is the Omniscient God, not unintelligent Nature or anything else; and here the topic is concluded. ‡

* गतेस्सर्वच्च वेदान्तषु चेतनकारणावगतेस्समत्वादित्यर्थः । न हि क्वचिदपि विरुद्धमुपलभ्यते कुचचिद्वाक्ये चेतनं कारणं कुचचिदचेतनमिति किन्तु सर्वच्च चेतनमेव कारणमुपलभ्यते । तैत्तिरीये ऋष्टिक्रमे अतय आत्मान एव कारणत्वन्दर्शयन्ति । अतस्सर्वथा प्रधानं सच्छब्दवाच्यं जगत्कारणञ्च न भवतीति परमार्थः ।

† किञ्च ।

‡ स्वशब्देनैव सर्वज्ञेश्वरो जगत्कारणमिति । मन्त्रस्य कश्चिज्जनितत्वा

CHAPTER II.

SECTION I. OF THE VARIOUS NAMES UNDER WHICH GOD IS SPOKEN OF.

A deity without qualities can be made the subject of reflection only by being first spoken of as if possessing qualities.

b. But then, if thus [—see § 11 *a*—] it be proved, by the Aphorisms § 1—11, that all the theological portions of the Vedas refer to God the Omniscient and Omnipotent,—then what further remains, for the sake of which another Aphorism need be added? If you ask this—it is replied:—since a deity without qualities cannot have his nature described [—for the description of anything is just the enumeration of the qualities of the thing—], you must consent to his being described as qualified by some characteristic* [which does not in reality belong to him;—just as, in seeking to determine the specific gravity, as compared with water, of a substance that is lighter than water, you must attach to it some other substance heavy enough to sink it, and then eliminate the superfluity from the joint result].

A canon of interpretation in respect of passages where the deity is spoken of as having qualities.

c. Some passages therein [i. e. in Scripture] are [intended to enjoin] devotions with a view to gradual emancipation; and some are intended to convey a knowledge of the truth;—and so wherever, in a passage

नचाधिप इत्यादि श्वेताश्वतराणां मन्त्रोपनिषदि श्रुतत्वादित्यर्थः ।
तस्मात्सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्म जगत्कारणं नाचेतनं प्रधानमन्यदेतिसिद्धम् ॥

* नन्वेवमथात इत्यारभ्य श्रुतत्वाच्चेतदन्तैः सूत्रैः सर्वेषां वेदान्तानां सर्वज्ञसर्वशक्तिब्रह्मपरत्वं समर्थितं किमपरमवशिष्टं यदर्थमुत्तरमूत्रसन्दर्भ इति चेदुच्यते । निर्विशेषब्रह्मणः स्वरूपेणोपदेशायोगात् किञ्चिदुपाध्युपहितत्वेनोपदेश इति वक्तव्यम् ॥

where qualities are spoken of, it is really intended to speak of the qualities, there the case in one of some religious observance [which it is intended to enjoin]; but wherever the quality—though mentioned—is not intended to be spoken of, [but is employed as a mere vehicle of the real meaning], there the passage is concerned about God as He is to be *known* [—not as He is to be acted towards]. It is with the view of determining this [i. e. of determining what are the passages in which the deity is spoken of as He is, or as He is to be acted towards, respectively,] that [—notwithstanding the suggestion, in § 11, *b.*, that no more need be said—] the following aphorism is presented.*

॥ आनन्दमयो ऽभ्यासात् ॥ १२ ॥

APH. 12. He [—the deity without qualities—] is “the One that consists of joy”—because it is the practice [of the Veda to speak of Him by that name].

a. But then [some one may object], the term “the one that consists of joy” cannot refer to a deity who is without qualities—for such a one is not *made up of portions* of delight, [—which the term would seem to imply—],—but it refers to the embodied soul, for that *is* spoken of in scripture as being made up of joy :—Well, if any one says this, I reply, it is not thus. The Supreme Soul *may* properly [be said to] consist of joy—why?—because [as sta-

* तच्च कानिचित् क्रमसुखार्थं न्यपासनानि कानिचिदभ्यदयार्थानि । एवञ्च यच्च सगुणवाक्ये गुणविवक्षा तच्चोपासना भवति यच्चतु श्रुयमाणो ऽपि गुणो न विवक्षितस्तच्च तद्वाक्यं ज्ञेयब्रह्मपरमिति निर्णयार्थमित्याशयेनोत्तरसूचारम्भ इति ॥

ted in the aphorism] "it is the practice;" —that is to say, because it is the practice [of the Veda] very often to apply to God the term "consisting of joy."*

When the deity is asserted to consist of so and so, it is not asserted that He was formed but of so and so.

b. [The next aphorism has reference particularly to the objection that the term discussed in the preceding paragraph must, in accordance with its grammatical form, mean some modification of something else, in which case, of course, it could not signify the Supreme Soul].

॥ विकारशब्दान्नेति चेन्न प्राचुर्यात् ॥ १३ ॥

APH. 13. If you say that it is not so [—i. e. that the term *ānandamaya*— § 12—does not refer to God—] because it is a word expressing what has undergone a change;—it is not as you say, —for it expresses the quantity [that constitutes, without any reference to there having been any change].

a. But then [—we remark in explanation—some one may still object], that which is "*made up of joy*" cannot be God [who is not made up of anything antecedently-existent]—why? —because [—the objector supposes—] the affix *mayat* [with which the word *ānanda-maya* "consisting of joy" is formed] implies a change [from one state or form to another—such as is undergone when curd is made out of milk, or a jar is made out of clay], and it is absurd to suppose that God is in such a way made up of joy:—well, if any one says this, I reply, it is not

* नन्वानन्दमयशब्दा न निर्गुणब्रह्मपरः तस्य प्रियाद्यनवयवत्वात्, किन्तु शरीरस्य बात्मन आनन्दमयत्वव्यवसायीवपर इति चेन्न । आनन्दमयः परमात्मा भवितुमर्हति । कुतः । अन्धा-
वात् । आनन्दमयशब्दस्य बहुकृत्वो ब्रह्मस्यैवाभ्यासादित्यर्थः ॥

thus. Why?—"because it is *quantity*" [that is spoken of, and not *change* from one state to another],—that is to say, because here the affix *mayat* is employed with an eye to the *quantity* of joy* [—according to *Pāṇini* V. 4. 21.—that is God; and not, as you suppose—according to *Pāṇini* IV. 3. 143.—that joy out of which something was at any time first made up].

b. He next states another reason why the affix *mayat* [§. 13. a.] is employed in the sense of quantity and not of change.†

॥ तद्धेतुव्यपदेशाच्च ॥ १४ ॥

APH. 14. And [God must consist of joy Himself if He be the Cause of joy. —§ 12—] because He is called [in scripture] the cause thereof.

a. That is to say—because, in scripture, God is named as the cause in respect thereof—i. e. of joy.‡

b. God is spoken of as the cause of joy in such texts as this—viz. "For He alone it is that causeth to rejoice." As those that enrich others must themselves be rich, so it is clear that there must be abundant joy with Him who causeth others to rejoice.§

* ननु नानन्दमय ब्रह्म । कुतः । विकारार्थमयट्प्रत्ययाद् । ब्रह्मणश्चानन्दविकारत्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेन्न । कुतः । प्राचुर्यात् । मयटः प्रकृते आनन्दप्राचुर्यवाचकत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

† मयटः प्राचुर्यार्थकत्वे हेत्वन्तरमाह ॥

‡ अतौ तमानन्द प्रति ब्रह्मणो हेतुत्वव्यपदेशादित्यर्थः ॥

§ एष ह्येवानन्दयातीति ब्रह्मण आनन्दहेतुत्वं व्यपदिश्यते । ये ऽन्यान् धनोर्कुर्वन्ति त एव धनिन इति वदो ऽन्यानानन्दयति स प्रचुरानन्द इति प्रसिद्धम् ॥

c. And he mentions that, for the following reason also, it must be the Supreme Soul that “consists of joy” * [—as asserted in § 12—] viz :—

॥ मान्त्रवर्णिकमेवच गीयते ॥ १५ ॥

The lyrical and the doctrinal parts of the Veda agree in representing God as made up of joy.

APH. 15. And to the same effect [—that the Supreme Soul, § 12, consists of joy—] is sung the comment on the hymn.

a. “Is sung”—that is to say, [by being sung] declares. [The drift of this argument is this]—because both the hymns (*mantra*) and the doctrinal portions of the scripture (*brāhmaṇa*) are unanimous† [in representing the Supreme Soul as consisting of joy].

b. And he states that it must be the Supreme Soul and not any embodied soul that is meant by the term “consisting of joy” [§. 12], for the following reason.‡

॥ नेतरो ऽनुपपत्तेः ॥ १६ ॥

Absurdity of supposing that any other than God is here meant.

APH. 16. It is none other [than God, that is spoken of—see §. 12.—as “consisting of joy,”] because there is an absurdity [in any other supposition].

a. That is to say—it is not any embodied soul—from the Lord downwards [see Vedānta Lecture No. 25]—that is meant by the term “consisting of joy :”—Why? “Because there is an absurdity.”

* इतश्चानन्दमयः परमात्मेत्याह ॥

† गीयते प्रदर्शयतीत्यर्थः । मन्त्रब्राह्मणयोरैकार्थत्वात् ।

‡ इतश्चानन्दमयः परमात्मा न जीव इत्याह ।

The meaning of the aphorism is this, that, antecedently to the creation [of the body] of "the Lord," we are told that He [of whom the term "consisting of joy" is correctly predicable] was one that *reflected* [see § 5], One that was Himself His creation, and One that was the cause of the creation [see § 2. and Vedānta Lecture, No. 40]; and all this would be absurd [if predicated of any other than the Supreme Soul]:—that is to say—since knowledge belonging to any inferior soul is dependent on there being a *body*—there could have been no *reflection** [by any *such* soul antecedently to the creation].

b. Moreover† [any inferior soul is not what is meant by "that which consists of joy"—§ 12—for the following reason].

॥ भेदव्यपदेशाच्च ॥ १७ ॥

It is no inferior soul that is spoken of as consisting of joy.

APH. 17. And [the inferior soul is not what consists of joy] because they are spoken of [in Scripture] as distinct.

a. The inferior soul is not what consists of joy;—why? because the inferior soul and that which consists of joy are spoken of as being distinct;—such is the meaning. What is here referred to is this, that, in the passage [for example] of the *Taitirīya* [section of the *Veda*] beginning "Truly that joy &c." the One "that consists of joy" and the inferior soul are spoken of under the respectively different characters of "what is to be obtained" and "the obtainer;"—for the obtainer is not the same as that

* ईश्वरादितरो जीवो नानन्दमयः । कुतः । अनुपपत्तिः ।
ईश्वरस्य सृष्टेः पूर्वमोक्षितत्वं सृष्ट्यात्मकत्वं सृष्टिहेतुत्वञ्च अयते
तत्सर्वस्यानुपपत्तेरिति सूचार्थः । जीवज्ञानस्य शरीरसाध्यत्वादोक्ष-
णानुपपत्तिरिति तात्पर्यम् ॥

† किञ्च ॥

which he is to obtain * [—and the inferior soul is here directed to aspire after “the One that consists of joy”].

b. But then [the followers of the Sāṅkhya will probably here suggest]—let it be *Nature* that is denoted by the term “consisting of joy” [§ 12]. With reference to this he says as follows†.

॥ कामाच्च नानुमानापेक्षा ॥ १८ ॥

APH. 18. And by reason of *desire* [which is attributed to that “which consists of joy”] no regard [is to be shown] to the argument [of the Sāṅkhyas, who attempt to prove that it is their unintelligent *Nature* that is spoken of in scripture as “consisting of joy”].

a. That is to say—we do not regard—i. e. we do not admit that *Nature* is “what consists of joy”, or that it is the cause [of joy—see § 14—]. Why?—“by reason of desire;”—i. e. because we find in Scripture, where the topic is “what consists of joy”, that this denotes one that *desires*; and it is impossible that *desire* should belong to that which is unintelligent ‡ [as *Nature* is held by the Sāṅkhyas themselves to be].

* नानन्दमयो जीवः । कुतः । जीवानन्दमययोर्भेदेन व्यपदिश्यमानत्वादित्यर्थः । तैत्तिरीयके रसो वै स इत्यारभ्य आनन्दमयस्य लब्धव्यत्वेन जीवस्य च लब्धव्यत्वेन भेदव्यपदेशः । नहि लब्धेव लब्धव्यो भवतीत्याशयः ॥

† नन्वानन्दमयशब्देन प्रधानमुच्यतां । तत्राह ॥

‡ आनन्दमयत्वेन कारणत्वेन वा प्रधानस्य नापेक्षा न स्वीकारः । कुतः । कामात् । आनन्दमयाधिकारे कामविद्वत्त्वसम्भवादित्यर्थः । नह्यचेतने कामसम्भवति ॥

b. [He supports the orthodox view by another argument as follows].

। अस्मिन्नस्यैव तद्योगं शक्तिः । १९ ।

APH. 19. And [the one “consisting of joy” cannot be an inferior soul, or Nature, because] the scripture teaches that in this [—which can therefore mean nothing else than the Supreme—] there is the beatification of that [inferior soul which obtains union therewith].

a. That is to say,—for the following reason also the term “consisting of joy” cannot mean either any inferior soul or [unintelligent] Nature, because the scripture teaches that in this—“the one consisting of joy” that we are concerned about—the [Supreme] Soul—there is to take place, in the case of him—i. e. of the enlightened inferior soul, *union therewith*—i. e. union with that [Supreme] Soul—[for such is the meaning of] “union therewith”—the attaining to the state of Him—in short] emancipation.*

b. Thus has it been settled definitively that [what is spoken of in scripture as] “what consists of joy” is the Supreme Soul † [and nothing else].

* इतश्च न जीवे प्रधाने वा आनन्दमयशब्दे यस्मादस्मिन्ना-
नन्दमये प्रकृते । आत्मनि । अस्य । प्रबुद्धस्य जीवस्य । तद्योगं
तदात्मना योगस्तद्योगस्तद्वापत्तिर्मक्तिरित्यर्थः । तं शक्तिं शक्तं ।
तस्मादित्यर्थः ।

† तस्मादा नन्दमयः परमात्मेति सिद्धम् ।

E

c. [The next point to be established is this, that it is the Supreme Soul that is spoken of in scripture as “the man in the sun” and “the man in the eye”].

॥ अतस्तद्वर्णोपदेशात् ॥ २० ॥

It is God that is spoken of as the man within the sun and within the eye.

APH. 20. [God alone is meant when mention is made, in scripture, of that which is] within [the sun and the eye], because there is mention of His characteristics [which can belong to none other.]

a. That is to say—He who is mentioned in scripture as “He that is within the sun” and “He that is within the eye,” is the Supreme alone and no one worldly. Why?—“because there is mention of His characteristics”—i. e. because, in these passages, there is mention of characteristics [such as absolute sinlessness] that belong only to Him who is the Supreme.*

b. [At this, as at other points, the commentators enter into details which the fear of prolixity constrains us to preternit].

c. Moreover † [He that is spoken of as “the man in the sun” is some one else than the sun’s soul—as is proved by the argument here following].

॥ भेदव्यपदेशाच्चान्यः ॥ २१ ॥

APH. 21. And [it is not the personal soul of the sun—the

* य एषो ऽन्तरादित्ये य एषो ऽन्तरक्षिणीति च श्रुयमाणः परमेश्वर एव न संसारी । कुतः । तद्वर्णोपदेशात् । तस्य परमेश्वरस्य ये धर्मास्तेषामस्मिन्वाक्ये उपदेशादित्यर्थः ॥

† किञ्च ॥

solar congener of the *anima mundi*—that is spoken of as “the man in the sun”—] because mention is made of a distinction [between these two].

a. That is to say—The “man” that is spoken of in scripture as being within the sun and within the eye, is some one other than any inferior soul which has the fancy [—erroneous in the case of any soul that fancies it has a body at all—] that its body is the sun. Why?—“because mention is made of a distinction.” [One of the passages cited in regard to this, is the one beginning] “He who, standing in the sun, yet other than the sun” &c.† [conf. § 20. b].

b. [The next point to be established is this that it is the Supreme Soul that is spoken of as the Ether in such a passage of scripture, as the one beginning] “Of this world what is the refuge?” To this he replied—‘The Ether’ &c.”

॥ आकाशस्तस्मिन्नात् ॥ २२ ॥

APH. 22. The Ether, [in certain passages, must be understood to mean God,] by reason of His characteristics [which are, in such passages, attributed to that which is there spoken of as the Ether].

* आदित्यान्तेरन्तः श्रुयमाणः पुरुष आदित्यशरोरभिमानिनो जीवादन्यः । कुतः । भेदव्यपदेशात् ॥

† य आदित्ये तिष्ठन्नादित्यान्तरो ऽयमित्यादि ॥

‡ अस्य लोकस्य का गतिरित्याकाश इति चेवाच ॥

a. That is to say—It is proper to understand, by the word **Ether, God, Why ?**—"by reason of his characteristic"—that is to say, because, in this passage [§ 21 b.], we find mentioned such a fact as that of being the creator of the great elements, which character belongs [only] to Him—i. e. to God.*

b. [The "breath of life," in like manner, is held to stand for **God**, in such a passage as] " 'Who is that deity'?—To this he replied—'The breath of life.' "†

॥ अत एव प्राण इति ॥ २३ ॥

APH. 23. For just the same reason, "the breath of life" [is to be understood to mean God.]
It is God that is in certain passages spoken of as the Breath of life.

a. "For just the same reason:"—that is to say, for the reason stated in the preceding aphorism [§ 22] viz, "by reason of His characteristics," [which could not be predicated of the mere "breath of life,"] it is God alone that is meant by the breath of life," [in the passage cited under § 22. b.]

b. But then [—some objector may go on to say—] let that pass—that in the passage about the breath of life [§ 22 b.]

* आकाशशब्देन ब्रह्मणो ग्रहणं युक्तं । कुतः । तद्विज्ञात् । तस्य ब्रह्मणो यद्विज्ञं महाभूतस्रष्टृत्वादिकं तस्यास्मिन् वाक्ये दृष्टत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

† कतमा सा देवतेति प्राण इति हेवाच ॥

‡ अत एव । पूर्वोक्ततद्विज्ञादिति हेतौरेव । प्राणः । प्राणशब्दवाच्यं ब्रह्मैवेत्यर्थः ॥

the [disputed] term *does* mean God, since the characteristics of God [—we are willing to admit—] are present [in that instance]; —but [the same argument will not avail you in the following passage, where we object to your assuming that the term “the light” means God]:—“Now the light that shines from beyond that the abode of the celestials &c.” The word “light,” here can mean only the sun or some other created splendour, for this the word notoriously is employed to denote; but it cannot mean God, who is without limits, because it is here spoken of as *having* a limit, when it is styled “the light *beyond* the abode of the celestials” &c. [well—rejoins the commentator—] this [objection] having presented itself, it is declared* [as follows.]

॥ ज्योतिश्चरणाभिधानात् ॥ २४ ॥

It is God that is in certain passages spoken of as the the Light.

APH. 24. The “light” [in certain passages means God], because there is mention of *feet* [which no ordinary light can be

said to possess.]

a. That is to say—here [i. e. in the passage cited under § 23. b.] it is God alone that is meant by the word “light.” Why?—“because of the mention of *feet*”—that is to say, because the Elements are spoken of as the feet [of *this* light,—and light, in the ordinary sense of the word, does not mean anything that has feet,—and these feet are spoken of] in such

* ननु प्राणवाक्त्रे ब्रह्मलिङ्गसत्त्वाद्भवतु तद्ब्रह्मपरं ॥ अथ यदतः परो दिवो ज्योतिर्दीप्यते इत्यत्र ज्योतिः पदं सूर्यादिभौतिकतेजः परमेव प्रसिद्धत्वात् । परो दिवो ज्योतिरित्यादिना सूर्यादाश्च-
षाच्च न निर्मर्यादब्रह्मपरमिति प्राप्ते उच्यते ॥

phrases as "The feet thereof are the pervading elements" [—which phrase is employed] in respect of God when regarded as residing in that text [—the most revered of all the texts of Scripture] called the *Gāyatrī*, which is declared to have four feet by the text beginning with "the *Gāyatrī*, indeed, is all this" &c.*

b. Moreover [—the commentator remarks—] although—by the expression "from beyond that" &c. [§ 23. b.] the mention is [apparently at least] of what has *limits* &c., yet this is not opposed to its being God ; for, [in accordance with the canon of interpretation laid down in § 11 c.] the passage in question is intended to enjoin certain religious observances [in regard to the "light"]. Besides—the word "light" is notoriously employed in the theological portions of the Veda to denote God ; therefore it is a settled point that here [§ 23. b.] the word "light" means God.†

c. [The next aphorism opposes the suggestion that the *feet* spoken of § 24. a., are the feet of the verse called the *Gāyatrī*,

* अत्र ज्योतिश्शब्दवार्थं ब्रह्मैव । कुतः । चरणाभिधानात् । गायत्री वा इदं सर्गमित्यादिना प्रतिपादितचतुष्पाद्गायत्र्याख्यवन्दोपाधिकब्रह्मणः पादो ऽस्य विश्वाभूतानि इत्यादिना भूतपादाभिधानादित्यर्थः ॥

† यदतः पर इत्यादिना श्रुतं मर्यादादिकमपि न ब्रह्मणो विरुद्धं तस्योपासनार्थत्वात् । ज्योतिश्शब्दो ब्रह्मण्यपि वेदान्तेषु प्रसिद्धस्तस्माज्ज्योतिश्शब्दो ऽत्र ब्रह्मपर एवेति सिद्धम् ॥

† The discordance in gender here is a Vaidik licence.

—such verse having four hemistichs, the name for which is the same as that for a foot.]

॥ ऋन्दो ऽभिधानान्नेति चेन्न तथा चेतो ऽर्पणनिगदात्तथा-
हि दर्शनम् ॥ २५ ॥

Why it cannot be the Gāyatrī that is referred to in such a passage. APH. 25. If you say that it is the *verse* [—see § 24. c.—of which it is intended to speak, and not the Deity—see § 24,—] it is not so ; because there is the direction to fix one's mind [on God] thus [i. e. through the medium of the *Gāyatrī*] ; for of such a way [of directing the mind to the contemplation of the deity] there is a view [of more than one example in scripture.]

a. “Thus :”—that is to say, because there is the direction or mention, of fixing one's mind or concentrating one's thoughts, by means of the verse [the *Gāyatrī*], on the Deity [regarded as] resident therein* [—§ 24. a.]

b. “For of such a way there is a view :”—that is to say,—in other passages also, by means of some modification [of God—such as the sun, the ether, &c.,] the worshipping of God [regarded as] resident therein, is *seen* [to be enjoined]. N. B., “there is a view of” means “there is seen.” †

* तथा । ऋन्दोद्द्वारेण तद्गते ब्रह्मणि चेतोऽर्पणस्य । चित्त-
समाधानस्य । निगदादभिधानादित्यर्थः ॥

† तथाहि दर्शनम् । अन्यत्रापि विकारद्वारेण तद्गतब्रह्मोपा-
सनं । दृश्यत इति दर्शनं । दृष्टमित्यर्थः ॥

c. Therefore it is a settled point that in the preceding passage [—see § 23. b.] it is God alone that is referred to, and not the verse * [called the *Gáyatrī*—see § 25.]

d. [He subjoins a further reason.]

॥ भूतादिपादव्यपदेशोपपत्तेश्चैवम् ॥ २६ ॥

A further reason why it cannot be the Gáyatrī that is referred to.

APH. 26. And [the fact is] thus [i. e. that the deity and not the verse called the *Gáyatrī* is referred to in the passage under discussion] because we meet with the mention of the *elements &c.*, as the feet [—see § 24—of that which is referred to in the passage in question.]

a. [That is to say] :— for the following reason also, it is to be understood that, in the passage respecting the *Gáyatrī* [§ 24. a.], it is God alone that is referred to :—such is the meaning of the word “thus” [in the aphorism § 26]. Why? :—“because the mention of the elements &c., as the feet can apply, [only to God]” :—that is to say, because the designation “The *Gáyatrī* “with its four feet, [which] are the elements, the earth, the “body, and the heart,” can apply to God alone; for the mention of *feet in the shape of the elements &c.*, can have no reference to the [verse called the] *Gáyatrī*—a thing consisting of a conglomeration of alphabetical characters.†

b. [The objector next proceeds to argue that what is spoken

* तस्मात्पूर्ववाक्ये ब्रह्मैव निर्दिष्टं न ह्यन्यद् इति सिद्धम् ॥

† इतश्च गायत्रीवाक्ये ब्रह्मैव प्रतिपाद्यमित्यव्यपगन्तव्यमित्येवं शब्दार्थः । कुतः । भूतादिपादव्यपदेशोपपत्तेः । भूतपृथिवीशरीरहृदयश्चतुष्पञ्जायतीति व्यपदेशस्य ब्रह्मण्येवोपपत्तेरित्यर्थः । न ह्यव्यपगन्तिवैश्वरूपगायत्र्या भूतादिपादव्यपदेशः संभवति ॥

of in one passage as being "*in the sky*," cannot be that which is, in another passage, spoken of as the Light shining "*from beyond the sky*." To this the author, who holds that it is God who is referred to in both passages, replies as follows.]

॥ उपदेशभेदान्नेति चेन्नाभयस्मिन्नयविरोधात् ॥ २७ ॥

God may be referred to under different aspects as regards locality.

APH. 27. If [you say that it is] not [God that is spoken of in a certain passage whilst He is spoken of in another] because there is a difference of declaration [in respect of what is spoken of in the one passage and in the other], it is not [as you say], because there is no incompatibility [in His being referred to] even in both.

a. 'If you say that it is not so, because there is a difference of declaration':—[to explain this;—suppose an objector says] but then, as regards the preceding passage [see § 23], the *sky*, in the passage "*In the sky* the immortal triad of feet thereof," is mentioned in the 7th [or locative] case as the *locus in quo* thereof [i. e., as the place *in* which is that which is spoken of—be that what it may:—and, on the other hand,] in the passage "Now the Light that shines thence *from beyond the sky*" [§ 23], the *sky* is mentioned in the 5th [or ablative] case as the *limit* [from *beyond* which shines whatever Light that may be that is spoken of]:—and so, since this difference of cases involves a difference of declaration [in respect of what is thus declared to be *in*, and what is declared to be *beyond* the sky], it is impossible to recognise, in the passage that speaks of *the Light*, [that which is spoken of in the *other* passage;—so that, granting that the one passage speaks of God, it is clear the other does not]:—well, if any one says all this, it is replied No:—why?—"because there

is no incompatibility [in His being referred to] even in both ;”—that is to say, because there is nothing to prevent His being recognised even in two descriptions involving different declensional terminations* [—for what is to prevent our regarding God as existing at once within this “ visible diurnal sphere” and beyond it] ?

b. Therefore it is a settled point that it is the Supreme Soul alone that is spoken as the *Light* [in the passage cited under § 23] and not any other created light.†

c. But then [some objector will say,] in the Upanishad called the *Kaushîtaki Brâhmaṇa*, in the narrative of Indra and [king] Pratardana, we hear [in reply to Pratardana’s question respecting the ‘summum bonum’], “He [Indra] said—‘I am the life, in the “shape of perfect knowledge;—do thou [that seekest to obtain “the summum bonum] worship me, that life immortal.’” In this passage [the objector will say] the word “life” means Indra’s vital

* ननु पूर्वस्मिन् वाक्ये चिपादस्यामृतन्दिवीति सप्तम्या द्यौराधार-
त्वेन निर्दिश्यते । अथ यदतः परो दिवो ज्योतिरित्यत्र पञ्चम्याव-
धित्वेन द्यौर्निर्दिश्यते । तथाच विभक्तिभेदेनापदेशभेदात् ज्यो-
तिर्वाक्ये प्रत्यभिज्ञा न सम्भवतीति चेत् । न । कुतः । उभय-
स्मिन्नप्यविरोधात् । विभक्तिभेदेनापदेशद्वये ऽपि प्रत्यभिज्ञाया
अविरोधादित्यर्थः ॥

† तस्मात्परं ब्रह्मव ज्योतिश्शब्दवाच्य नान्यङ्गीतिकं तेज
इति सिद्धम् ॥

spirit, for such is notoriously the sense of the term,—and it does not mean the Supreme Soul. This [objection] having presented itself, it is declared as follows.*—

॥ प्राणस्तथानुगमात् ॥ २८ ॥

That the term Life, in a certain passage, means God, shown from the context. APH. 28. The Life [—§ 27. c.—means God alone] because of the conclusion that it does so, [which conclusion is forced upon us by an examination of the context].

a. That is to say,—there [i. e. in the passage cited under § 27. c.] the word 'life' means God alone:—why?—“because of the conclusion that it does so”—i. e. because we must conclude, or admit, that it does so—i. e. that it does mean God.†

b. To explain,—Pratardana, verily, [when he received the reply of Indra, § 27. c.,] was enquiring what was the thing most desirable for man. To him, thus desirous of the summum bonum, the injunction to worship the *Life* is given in the passage beginning “I am the Life” &c. And [—since God alone is the summum bonum and the sole proper object of worship—] how can that which is thus indicated as the chief end of man be the vital spirit [of Indra]? Therefore, by looking forwards and backwards [and

* ननु कौषीतकीब्राह्मणोपनिषदि इन्द्रप्रतर्दनाख्यायिकायां श्रूयते । सहोवाच प्राणो ऽस्मि प्रज्जात्मा तं मामायुर्मृतमुपास्तेति । तच्च प्राणशब्द इन्द्रप्राणवायुपरः प्रसिद्धत्वात् न परमात्मपर इति प्राप्त उच्यते ॥

† तच्च प्राणो ब्रह्मैव । कुतः । तथानुगमात् । तथा । ब्रह्मपरत्वेन । अनुगमात् । अवगमादित्यर्थः ॥

thus bringing the light of the context to bear upon the question] it is settled for certain that the term 'Life' [in § 27. c.] means God alone.*

[c.—The objector being understood still to contend that Indra cannot mean God by the term 'Life,' when he is speaking of *himself* as the 'Life,' the following aphorism is enunciated].

॥ न वक्तुरात्मोपदेशादिति चेदध्यात्मसम्बन्ध

भूमाच्चस्मिन् ॥ २९ ॥

A change of topic is not to be supposed in the absence of evidence that any change is intended.

APH. 29.—If [you say that it is] not [God that it meant by the term 'Life' in the passage under § 27 c.,] because the speaker is mentioning *himself*—[it is replied that it is God]—for in this [section of the Veda where the passage occurs] there is abundance of reference to the Superintending Spirit [—and a change of reference is not to be supposed without some evidence that a change is intended].

a.—[That is to say—we may suppose the objector to continue:] but then what you say—viz., that the term 'Life' [§ 27 c.] means God—is *not* right;—such is the meaning of the 'not' [the first word in *Aph.* 29]. Why [is it not right]? 'Because the

* तथाहि । प्रतर्दनः खलु हिततमं पुरुषार्थं पृष्टवान् । तस्य परमपुरुषार्थकामस्य प्राण उपास्यत्वेनोपदिश्यते प्राणे ऽस्मीत्यादिना । एवञ्च परमपुरुषार्थत्वेनोपदिश्यमानः कथं प्राणवायुः स्यात् । तस्मात् पूर्वापरपर्यालोचनया ब्रह्मपरमेव प्राणपदमिति सिद्धम् ॥

speaker is mentioning *himself**—i.e. because it is of himself that the speaker, viz., Indra, is making mention.*

b.—To explain ;—[the objector says that God is not meant] because the speaker, viz. Indra, a certain embodied kind of deity, indicates *himself* to Prataardana in that egotistic speech beginning with “Come—do thou know *me*”—and then going on “*I am the Life, in the shape of perfect knowledge*” &c. Therefore this is a mention of the deity [Indra] himself, [and not of the Supreme Soul]. This [objection] having presented itself, it is declared [§ 29—that it is not so—] “for in this there is abundance of reference to the Superintending Spirit ;”—that is to say—for, or because, in this, viz., section [of the *Kaushîtakî Brâhmaṇa*—§ 27. c.], there is found abundance, or a great deal, of reference to the Superintending Spirit, or of relation to the Supreme Soul. Therefore—i. e. from the abundance of reference to the Supreme Soul [in the section in question, which is almost entirely concerned therewith,]—it is a settled point that it is God, under the aspect of the Life, and not any [embodied] deity, that is here spoken of.†

* ननु यदुक्तं प्राणो ब्रह्मेति तदयुक्तमिति नञर्थः । कुतः । वक्त्रात्मोपदेशात् । वक्तुस्त्रिंश्यात्मत्वेनोपदेशादित्यर्थः ॥

† तथाहि वक्ता हीन्द्रो नाम कश्चिद्विग्रहवान् देवताविशेषः स्वात्मानं प्रतर्दनायोपदिशति मामेहि विजानाहीत्युपक्रम्य प्राणो ऽस्मि प्रज्ञात्मेत्येवं अहङ्कारवादेन । तस्मादयं देवतात्मोपदेश इति प्राप्त उच्यते अध्यात्मसम्बन्धभूमा ह्यस्मिन्निति । हि यस्मात् । अस्मिन् । अध्याये । अध्यात्मसम्बन्धस्य । परमात्मसम्बन्धस्य ।

c.—Why then *does* the speaker talk of himself [if it be God that is meant in the passage in which Indra—see § 27. c.—says “*I am the life*” &c.]? This having become a matter of dubitation, he declares as follows.*

॥ शास्त्रदृष्ट्यातूपदेशो वामदेववत् ॥ ३० ॥

The identification of one's self with another accordant with scripture.

APH. 30. But the mention, [by Indra, of *himself* as the Supreme Spirit], was with an eye to the Scripture, [which authorises such a form of expression], as VĀMADEVA [identifies himself, in another place, with Manu and with Sūryā].

a.—That is to say—the mention of the speaker, Indra, in the passage “*Do thou know me*” &c.” [§ 29. b.] is to be understood with an eye to the scripture :—that is to say, he [Indra] was speaking whilst looking upon the matter under that scriptural view which is conveyed in the text “*I myself* [—whoever may “be the speaker—] am the Supreme Soul.”†

b. Of this [way of regarding one's self as identified with another] there is an example [cited in the aphorism—in the words] ‘as VĀMADEVA’;—that is to say—as VĀMADEVA, in accordance with the scriptural view, said “*I was Manu, and I was Sūrya.*”

भूमा । बाहुल्यमुपलभ्यत इत्यर्थः । तस्मादध्यात्मसम्बन्धबाहु-
ल्यात्माणात्मकब्रह्मोपदेश एवायं न देवतात्मोपदेश इति सिद्धम् ॥

* कथन्तर्हि वक्तुरात्मोपदेश इत्याशङ्क्याह ॥

† इन्द्रस्य वक्तृत्वामेव विजानीहीत्युपदेशः शास्त्रदृष्ट्या ज्ञात-
व्यः । अहमेव परं ब्रह्मेति शास्त्रदृष्ट्या पश्यन्नेवमुक्तवानित्यर्थः ॥

Therefore it is a settled point that this passage [see § 27. c.] refers to God under the aspect of 'the Life.'*

c. [In the next aphorism a compromise in regard to the passage cited under § 27. c. is rejected.]

जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गान्नेति चेन्नोपासार्थेविध्यादाश्रितत्वादिह त-
द्योगात् ॥ ३१ ॥

APH. 31. If [you say that it is] not [God *alone* that is meant by the term 'Life' in the passage under § 27 c.] because there is here the mark by which the [embodied] soul and that by which the breath of life is recognised ;—[then we reply] Nay,—because [if the case were as you pretend, then] there would be *three* sorts of worshippings [enjoined], and because those [characteristics] are here annexed by reason of which the term must [be seen to] refer [to God alone.]

a. But then [the objector—aiming at a compromise—may say], what you remark [in APH. 29], that the 'Life' does not mean the [embodied] deity [Indra], because there is such abundant reference [in the section where the term occurs] to the Supreme Soul ;—this is quite true. Still the passage does not refer *solely* to God, but it refers also to the [embodied] soul, and to the chief spirit [the breath of life]. Why?— 'because there is here the mark by which the [embodied] soul and that by which the breath of life is recognised ;'—that is to say, there is the

* तत्र दृष्टान्तः । वामदेववदिति । यथा वामदेवः शास्त्र-
दृष्ट्या अहं मनुरभवं सूर्यस्येत्याह तद्वदित्यर्थः । तस्मात्प्राणात्मकब्रह्म-
परमेतदाक्यमिति सिद्धम् ॥

mark by which the [embodied] soul is recognised, and the mark by which the breath of life is recognised.*

b. [To pass over the arguments by which the objector attempts to show that three things, and not merely one, are referred to in the passage under discussion,—the commentator, explaining the rejection of any compromise, says]—if you say that it is not God [alone that is meant,—then we say] *No* ;—that is to say—it is not proper [to say as you do]. Why ?—‘ be- ‘ cause there would be a threefold case of devotion, ;—that is to say,—because, if the case were such [as you attempt to make it out to be], we should have [enjoined upon us] a worshipping of three descriptions, viz. (1) a worshipping of the [embodied] soul, (2) a worshipping of the breath of life, and (3) a worshipping of God;† [for Indra, in the disputed passage, enjoins the worshipping of ‘ the Life’, whilst, of course, none but God can be the proper object of worship.]

c. Since, on the supposition that *God* is meant, the whole, from first to last, is one consistent discourse ; it is improper to suppose that there are different discourses. Therefore, since the word ‘ Life’ is employed elsewhere—viz. in [the passage referred

* ननु यदुक्तमध्यात्मसम्बन्धवाङ्मत्यान् देवतात्मा प्राण इति तत्सत्यं । तथापि न ब्रह्मपरमेवेदं वाक्यं किन्तु जीवमुख्यप्राणवा-
युपरमपि । कुतः । जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गात् । जीवलिङ्गात् ।
मुख्यप्राणलिङ्गाच्च ॥

† न ब्रह्मेति चेत् । न । न युक्तमित्यर्थः । कुतः । उपासाच्चै-
व्यात् । एवं सति त्रिविधमुपासनं प्रसज्येत जीवोपासन मुख्यप्रा-
णोपासनं ब्रह्मोपासनञ्चेति ॥

to in APH. 23—viz.] the text “For the same reason the Life [means God,”—since—we repeat—the word ‘life’ is there employed] as referring to God, in virtue of the *characteristic* of God [there recognised—see § 22]; so it is a settled point that here also the mention is solely of God, because of there being annexed [see —§ 28. *b.*—] the mention of characteristics that belong to God alone—such as that of being the summum bonum.*

d. So much for the first quarter of the first lecture, entitled ‘The Distinct Definition of the Supreme Soul.’†

e. [Let us here take a retrospective *Retrospective glance.* glance at the ground gone over. In the first place it is to be remarked that the aim of this division of the Aphorisms is to determine distinctly what is meant by the term God, and by what other terms in Scripture God is meant. The former of these questions is determined in the first four aphorisms, the latter in the remaining twenty-seven.

f. As the enquiry is conducted with the view of ascertaining the *sense* of Scripture, it will be observed that all the reasonings proceed on the hypothesis (—see the Nyāya Aphorisms, Book I No. 30,—) that the *authority* of Scripture is not disputed.

* उपक्रमोपसंहाराभ्यां ब्रह्मपरत्वेन एकवाक्यत्वे सम्भवति वाक्यभेदो न युक्तः । अत एव प्राण इत्येवान्यत्र ब्रह्मलिङ्गवशात् प्राणशब्दस्य ब्रह्मणि प्रवृत्तेराश्रितत्वात्, इहापि हिततमोपन्यासादि ब्रह्मलिङ्गयोगाद्ब्रह्मण एवायमुपदेश इति सिद्धम् ॥

† इति प्रथमाध्यायस्य प्रथमः स्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गपादः ॥

g. Of the twenty-seven aphorisms in which it is sought to determine what are the terms by which, in Scripture, it is God that is really meant, Mr. Colebrooke, in his essays Vol. 1. p. 338, gives the following summary :—

“ The omnipotent, omniscient, sentient cause of the universe, is “ (*ānandamaya*) essentially happy. He is the brilliant golden per-
“ son, seen *within* (*antar*) the solar orb and the human eye. He
“ is the *etherial* element (*ākāś’a*), from which all things proceed
“ and to which all return. He is the *breath* (*prāna*) in which all
“ beings merge, into which they all rise. He is the *light* (*jyotish*)
“ which shines in heaven, and in all places high and low, everywhere
“ throughout the world, and within the human person. He is the
“ *breath* (*prāna*) and intelligent self, immortal, undecaying
“ and happy, with which *Indra*, (in a dialogue with *Pratardana*,)
“ identifies himself.”

The reader of this summary must not understand it as containing the Vedāntin’s *description* of God. The risk of its being so understood might perhaps have been best avoided by *converting* each of the propositions, and making the predicate take the place of the subject. No doubt the Vedāntin holds that God is everything; and therefore all these things; but BĀDARĀYAṆA, in his twenty-seven aphorisms, is not concerned about establishing this, or anything like it. He is bent on declaring, not that God is this that or the other thing, but on determining that this that and the other *term*, which might seem, in certain passages of scripture, to mean something else than God simply, really is employed in the sense of nothing else than God simply.

h. Since a reader not conversant with the topics handled by BĀDARĀYAṆA may be apt to think that needless difficulties are

occasionally started, and needless trouble taken to remove them, we would here refer the reader to our remarks at the conclusion of the first Book of the Nyāya Aphorisms. BĀDARĀYAṆA did not *make* the difficulties, but he *found* them. The objections were extant ; and those that had any show of plausibility—whilst the objector conceded the authority of the Vedas—BĀDARĀYAṆA, bent on demonstrating the consistency of the Vedas, did not consider himself at liberty to ignore].

—oo—

॥ मिरजापुर ॥

। यतीमें के छापाखाने में छापी गई ।

॥ सन १८५१ ईस्वी ॥



